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10 July 1981

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	TEMORANDOM FOR. Executive Committee Members	
	FROM : Robert M. Gates Director, DCI/DDCI Executive Staff CAN(EXEC COV.	1)
	SUBJECT: Minutes of the Executive Committee Meeting, 2 July 1981	
25X1 25X1 25X1	1. The Executive Committee met on 2 July 1981 on two topics: The Public Release of NFAC Unclassified Reports and the Status of the Center for the Study of Intelligence (CSI). Admiral Inman chaired the session; other participants included Messrs. McMahon (D/NFAC);  (DDO); Fitzwater (DDA); Taylor (ADDS&T); Lipton (Compt.);  (DD/EEO); Briggs (IG); (OGC); Gates (D/OPP); and  (D/Public Affairs).	25X1
25X1 25X1	2. Public Release of NFAC Unclassified Reports. Admiral Inman noted that he had requested NFAC to prepare the staff study on this topic that had been provided to Committee members. In response to the DDCI's question, advised that with appropriate advance notice, the Agency could legally end its participation in the various programs it now uses to disseminate NFAC unclassified reports (DOCEX, NTIS, et cetera). He also noted that he expected a pending decision to reverse a 1977 OGC opinion that the Agency was required to participate in the Federal Depository Library Program. Admiral Inman noted that he had no problem with publishing unclassified reports that support legitimate government activities. He then elicited members' views on releasing those documents to the public.	25X1
25X1 25X1	observed that documents were either classified or unclassified, and withholding the latter would lead to problems. He suggested that NFAC could stop sanitizing classified documents for public release, and the flow of unclassified reference materials could gradually be decreased. He also suggested that the latter should be done quietly, without an announcement of a major policy change.	
	4. Mr. McMahon said that he was personally concerned that any unclassified CIA publication could have an adverse impact on the protection of sources and methods. He was willing, however, to alter his recommendation to permit the publication of unclassified basic reference material and to discontinue the publication of any un-	
25X1	classified analytical pieces. He noted that NFAC does not produce any publication without a government requirement. He also said that the cost of producing unclassified publications for public distribution was minimal and should not be a factor for consideration.  urged that the Agency retain its relationship with NTIS if it decided to continue releasing unclassified reference material.	Ŋ
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5. Mr. Fitzwater raised the issue of removing Agency attribution from unclassified material. The DDCI said that he had no problem with the Agency seal appearing on reference documents providing a service of common concern, like those produced When analytical pieces are sanitized for government use, however, he would prefer to see them published under or other appropriate auspices. He suggested deferring further discussion of this issue for a future Committee discussion of the internal handling of cover.	
6. Messrs. Taylor and Lipton favored continuing distribution of unclassified reference materials and discontinuing the release of unclassified analytical pieces, which tend to embroil the Agency in policy debates. Messrs. Gates and Fitzwater preferred not to distribute any unclassified material with Agency attribution.  Mr. Briggs concurred, highlighting findings of a recent inspection of the Office of Public Affairs. Noting the liklihood of increased future demands for economic and societal data, he urged that the Agency plan ahead for releasing that type of material through appropriate government agencies without Agency attribution.	
of unclassified material as much as possible, providing it only to government customers on request. Admiral Inman observed that while the Agency serves government customers by charter, it has come to serve many nongovernment customers by practice. Two academics have already written the DCI suggesting that their ability to be helpful to the Agency would be impaired if they no longer had access to the Agency's unclassified materials. Mr. McMahon pointed out that cutting off the flow of unclassified publications could result in a significant increase in FOIA requests.	
8. Admiral Inman concluded that, subject to review with the DCI, the Agency should:	
- Continue for the nearterm producing basic unclassified reference materials and making them available through the Library of Congress (DOCEX), Department of Commerce (NTIS), the Government Printing Office, and the Federal Depository Library Program. These materials should no longer be disseminated to the public through Public Affairs, Legislative Liaison or the Domestic Contact Division.	
<ul> <li>Discontinue producing unclassified analytical pieces with Agency attribution for public distribution.</li> </ul>	•
<ul> <li>On a case by case basis, sanitize classified Agency products on the request of other government departments for release through those departments. If necessary,</li> </ul>	

the Agency could initiate this process.

<ul> <li>Examine other possible procedures for making CIA unclassified reference materials available, including initiating discussions with the Department of State.</li> </ul>
- Continue the exchanges between analysts and academics, ensuring that analysts specify that the unclassified analytical judgments they share are their own personal views, not those of the Agency.
9. Status of the CSI. Admiral Inman summarized Mr. Fitzwater's paper outlining the ups and downs of the Center and its current need for additional support from the Directorates. Mr. Lehman, Chairman of the Center's Board of Advisors, emphasized that for the Center to be effective, it needs good, experienced officers to serve as fellows, a Director with considerable standing, and a strong Board of Advisors—preferably the Deputy Directors. Linking the Center to the Agency's decisionmaking channels would make it both more effective and a more career enhancing place to work.
10. Messrs. Lipton and favored eliminating the Center, using its existing resources for other purposes. Messrs. McMahon, Gates and Briggs suggested that the Center should be retained as a vehicle for asking basic questions about how the Agency does its business, organizing seminars facilitating the exchange of ideas between employees and senior managers, and developing and accumulating the basic literature of the intelligence profession. Suggestions for breathing new life into the Center included making it a responsibility of the Executive Committee and designing more flexible tours enabling fellows to work on short-term as well as long-term projects at the Center. In response to the DDCI's question, Mr. Lehman explained that the Studies in Intelligence and Contra publications could continue if the Center were disbanded.
11. Admiral Inman emphasized his belief that as the Agency rebuilds in the coming decade, it needs to focus on professionalism. He acknowledged that there were not many tools available in the Intelligence Community to sustain such an effort. From his past experience in using fellows similar to those at the Center, he found that they were valuable only if they were carefully selected, placed near the top of the organization, and able to see how the organization functions from that vantage point. He requested that the Office of Policy and Planning take a second look at the question of the Center to determine if there were other options for sustaining its work. He noted that he would be reluctant to place the Deputy Directors on the Center's Board of Advisors, given their heavy workload.
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